The paper is devoted to study of manipulability of scoring voting rules. We present a conjectural list of inequalities, which are satisfied by a profile if and only if it is manipulable by a coalition Coal A k (of members of electorate who prefer A k over the winner). The conjecture is verified for all positional rules with m = 4 alternatives and for general m with mild restrictions on the weights. In particular, it is established for the plurality and antiplurality rule (any m) and the Borda count (m ≤ 6 candidates). The shares of manipulable outcomes for plurality, anti-plurality and Borda count in case of m = 4 alternatives are presented and the Python code for carrying out the computation in case of Borda count is provided.
1. Introduction 1.1. General statement of the problem. The problem of manipulation in social choice theory has attracted attention during last decades. A number of studies has been conducted on the evaluation of the degree of manipulability of social rules [AK99, Cha85, CGZ05, LM94, LLS08, Sch13, PW07, WP07] and a geometric approach to the analysis of manipulability of voting rules was suggested (the description can be found in [CGZ05] ).
In [LM94] the share of manipulable outcomes (the result is called manipulable if there exists a subset of the set of voters such that the preferences of all the voters outside the subset remain the same, while the preferences of voters within the subset can be altered in such a way that the winner changes, and each of the voters from the subset is 'happy about the change') for plurality rule, anti-plurality rule, plurality with runoff, anti-plurality with runoff was computed, and in [FLS02] and [LLS08] the corresponding result for Borda count was obtained.
The geometric setup for voting theory problems first appeared in [Saa95] . It allowed to represent the share of manipulable outcomes as a ratio of the number of lattice points inside a certain region of the simplex to the number of lattice points inside the simplex itself. If the limit case n → ∞ (here n is the number of voters) is considered, the share of manipulable outcomes becomes the ratio of corresponding volumes. We will mainly treat the limit case in this paper.
1.2. Main results and structure of the paper. The goal of the paper is twofold: to provide the set of inequalities cutting out the region (union of polyhedra) inside the simplex of all normalized profiles, which contain the manipulable profiles and advertise a well known probabilistic method (going under the name of Monte Carlo) of computing the share (respective volume) of such. To the best of our knowledge the Monte Carlo method is very rarely used for computations of this kind arising in social choice theory, while it is not hard to carry out in practice and produces results with an excellent level of precision. After recalling the basic geometric setup for voting theory problems introduced in [Saa95] in Section 2, we focus on a detailed exposition of the new approach for obtaining the list of inequalities a profile satisfies if and only if it is manipulable in case of 3 alternatives. The corresponding inequalities are provided for all scoring rules. The core of the present paper is Section 4, where the main results are presented. We start of with providing the conjectural list of inequalities a profile satisfies if and only if it is manipulable (see Conjecture 4.5) by a coalition Coal A k (of members of electorate who prefer A k over the winner) and show its necessity. The conjecture is verified for all positional rules with m = 4 alternatives and for general m with mild restrictions on the weights (see Theorem 4.8 for the precise statement). In particular, Conjecture 4.5 is established for the plurality and anti-plurality rule (any m) and the Borda count (m ≤ 6). After a brief outline of the application of Monte Carlo method, we present the share of manipulable outcomes for plurality, anti-plurality and Borda count in case of m = 4 alternatives in Table 4 .3. It turns out that for the Borda count approximately 95.65% profiles are manipulable, while the plurality and anti-plurality rule are slightly over 87% each.
The Python code for carrying out the computation of the share of manipulable outcomes in case of Borda count with m = 4 alternatives is provided in Appendix A. A detailed outline on the execution complimentary to the comments inside the code is given. The recipe for finding the corresponding results for other scoring rules with m = 4 or in case m = 5 or 6 alternatives, when Conjecture 4.5 holds, is provided.
Finally, Appendix B is devoted to the study of a specific type of manipulation in case of m = 3, which includes not only the fact of manipulability but the manipulability which leads to the winning of the desired alternative as well 1 . Very often (if not always) exactly this type of manipulation is of interest to the voter expressing strategic behavior. Indeed, the goal of strategic behavior in voting is to guarantee the desired outcome to be the winner. If there are doubts on this outcome one can hardly deviate from her true preferences. To be precise, we call the result significantly manipulable (for short, SM) if there exists a group of voters (with the same prior candidate in their preferences) whose candidate did not emerge as the winner, nevertheless, they could have chosen different preferences such that if the other voters' preferences remained the same, the candidate would win. The restriction on coalitions is motivated by the fact that agreement on the most preferable candidate is a solid ground for people to unite in a coalition. Their most desirable result is that this candidate wins the election, which is the reason why the case of significant manipulability is studied separately. The shares of SM results for plurality, anti-plurality, Borda and Coombs' procedures in case of m = 3 alternatives are shown in Table 6 .1. It turns out that among the investigated voting rules anti-plurality is the most manipulable and plurality -the least.
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Geometry of voting
The voters' preferences are assumed to be linear orders. The number of voters is denoted by n and the number of alternatives -by m.
Definition 2.1. A profile p is an m!-tuple of non-negative integer numbers (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n m! ) (each n i is equal to the number of voters with preferences of type i) such that n i = n.
Remark 2.2. Throughout the paper the preferences are always listed in alphabetical order. For example, in case of m = 3 alternatives the number of people with preference (A, B, C) is n 1 , (A, C, B) n 2 , (B, A, C) n 3 , (B, C, A) n 4 , (C, A, B) n 5 and (C, B, A) n 6 .
Another natural assumption throughout the paper is that all voting situations are equally likely to occur. This probability distribution is known as the Impartial Anonymous Culture. (IAC) assumption. It was introduced by Gehrlein and Fishburn in [FG76] .
Definition 2.3. The outcome of an election is said to be manipulable if there exists a candidate i such that all members of the electorate for whom he is preferable over the winning alternative can change their preferences in such a way that this candidate wins the election (the preferences of the rest of the electorate remain the same).
Example 2.4. Let m = 3 and the scoring rule be Borda count. According to this procedure a candidate ranked i gets (3 − i) points (if the preference is (A, B, C), A is awarded 2 points, B -1 point and C does not receive any points at all). To show a manipulable outcome, we set n 1 = 5, n 3 = 4, n j = 0, j = 1, 3. By the definition of Borda count candidate A gets 14, B -13 and C -0 points. But if three voters chose (B, C, A) instead of (B, A, C), and the others kept their preferences unchanged, then the final result would be A -11, B -13, C -3 in favor of candidate B. Now the question that arises is to compute the probability that the result of an election will be manipulable. The approach described in [CGZ05] tells us an effective way to tackle this problem for the three candidates case. When we have more than three alternatives, however, this algorithm becomes too complicated in practice.
Let us have a look at the geometry behind the elections. The geometric approach to voting theory was introduced by Donald G. Saari [Saa95] . It was a major breakthrough that led to a significant simplification of numerous counting problems in voting theory. We give a brief outline of this approach below. Consider a 6-dimensional vector space with the basis enumerated by all possible preferences. Then as all the profiles are linear combinations of preferences with nonnegative integer coefficients that sum up to n, they lie within the simplex n i = n, n i ≥ 0.
But we are interested in certain types of situations, in fact, in those points in the simplex, which correspond to manipulable profiles. How can these points be separated from the others? Every condition on the profile ('A gets more points than B', 'B gets more points than C', etc.) can be written in the form of a linear inequality. Thus, manipulable profiles correspond to the points in the simplex, which are common solutions of certain linear inequalities, in other words, those profiles above or below (according to the sign of the inequality) the hyperplane determined by it (for each of the inequalities). Thus, the simplex is cut into two (convex) polytopes, when the first inequality is taken into consideration. The next inequality determines another hyperplane which slices the polytope obtained on the first step into two, etc. For example, when candidate A has a score greater or equal than the score of candidate B, the inequality responsible for that is 2(n 1 + n 2 ) + n 3 + n 5 ≥ 2(n 3 + n 4 ) + n 1 + n 6 .
We should also distinguish between the case of a finite number n of voters and 'the limit case' n → ∞. The principal difference is that in a finite type election the number of manipulable results is found by counting lattice points inside the polytopes. As for the limit case -normalize the n i by setting p i = n i /n with p 1 + . . . + p 6 = 1 (this obviously does not affect the final ranks), and as n is growing, more points fall inside the polytope (the lattice is somehow 'diminished'), until finally (in the limit) every point of the polytope becomes a result of some voting (with infinite number of voters). Then the answer is given in terms of volumes of certain polyhedra.
Let P be a polytope. Counting the number of lattice points inside the polytope N(P) is usually more complicated than evaluating its volume. If all the vertices of the polytope are points of the lattice (such a polytope is called integral), the number N(P) can be expressed via a polynomial E(t, P), where (t, P) corresponds to the polytope formed by multiplying each vertex coordinates by t. This was proved by Ehrhart (E(t, P) is called Ehrhart's polynomial). If the polytope is not integral, E(t, P) becomes a quasi-polynomial (the coefficients are periodic functions with integral period, see [Ehr67, Ehr67b]).
The procedure of obtaining the required polytope P is recursive. On each step the polytope obtained on the previous step is cut with the next hyperplane and its faces of all dimensions are determined (the picture below provides a low-dimension illustration). The new vertices are all of the old ones that are above or on the hyperplane (without loss of generality assume that the inequality is of the type 'something is greater than zero') plus the vertices that appear when an edge which is formed by one vertex above and one below the hyperplane is sliced by it 2 . The faces of other dimensions (vertices are faces of dimension 0) can be obtained similarly (either they are above the hyperplane, cut by the hyperplane themselves or a face one dimension greater is cut by the hyperplane). More details can be found in [CGZ05] .
Having these polytopes, the next step is to calculate their volumes. The basic idea is to cut the polytope into pyramids and evaluate their volumes using the fact that V = 1 n hV base , where V is the volume of an n -dimensional pyramid and V base is the volume of its base. After that we need to find the volume of the base (which is of dimension n − 1). It is computed exactly the same way. The process terminates when the base becomes a polygon on the plane and its 2 -dimensional volume (area) is evaluated. Having found the areas of all of the required polygons, compute the volumes of 3-dimensional pyramids, etc. The volume of the polytope on each step is the sum of the volumes of the pyramids it is cut into. To make the procedure more effective, take on each step the vertex that is adjacent to the maximal number of facets (faces of the greatest dimension). This procedure is also outlined in [CGZ05] .
Case of m = 3 alternatives
Let the candidates be refered to as A, B and C and consider a general scoring rule, i.e. the most preferred candidate gets α points, the second β and the last γ.
Definition 3.1. Consider a positional voting rule with m candidates and s.t. the first candidate in the preference list of a voter is assigned w 1 points, the second w 2 , etc. We will refer to the vector (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m ) as the weight vector.
It is natural to assume α ≥ β ≥ γ and take the degenerate case α = β = γ out of consideration. Notice that simultaneous shift and rescaling of the weight vector w = (α, β, γ) does not influence the final ranking of the alternatives. If β = γ, subtracting γ and dividing by α, we see that the rule is equivalent to the plurality rule. Otherwise, subtracting γ and dividing by β − γ we see that any positional voting rule for m = 3 alternatives (except plurality) is equivalent to one with w = (λ, 1, 0) with λ ≥ 1.
Next we address the question of manipulability. First, note that exactly 2 different coalitions can be formed (for each candidate, who has not won the election, there is a group of voters, who rank him higher than the winner). As any coalition is determined by the candidate it would prefer to have as the winner of the election, the candidates' names will be used for the notations of the coalitions hereafter. Such a candidate will be called unifying for the coalition, i.e. we have that candidate B is unifying for the coalition Coal B formed by voters with preferences (B, A, C), (B, C, A) and (C, B, A) and candidate C is unifying for the coalition Coal C formed by voters with profiles (C, A, B), (C, B, A) and (B, C, A). Note, that the preferences (B, C, A) and (C, B, A) participate in both coalitions, i.e. p 4 , p 6 ⊂ Coal B ∩ Coal C .
Definition 3.2. The size (normalized number of voters) of a coalition Coal Z will be denoted by C Z . For example, if m = 3, one has C B = p 3 + p 4 + p 6 .
Remark 3.3. We consider the general case of m alternatives. Since the unifying candidate can be any alternative except the winner, m − 1 coalitions can be formed. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we consider the coalitions of maximal sizes, i.e. each coalition consists of all voters with the unifying candidate ranked higher than the winner in their preferences, the set of such preferences has cardinality m! 2 .
Definition 3.4. We introduce intermediate preferences, these are the preferences of the form ( * , * , . . . , * ) with each * symbol being either a candidate's name or the ? mark, the latter representing that this rank has yet to be assigned by the voter. A typical example of an intermediate preference is (C, ?, A), where the member of electorate is undecided on the second position in his list.
The next step is to understand when a coalition can manipulate the outcome of the election. We claim that for every coalition there exists a system of inequalities, which determines all the profiles (the polytope, inside which they lie), manipulable by it. Obviously, if we count the number of points for each alternative prior to the coalition participants' arrangement of all the places except the first which is given to the unifying alternative A k (i.e. having intermediate preferences of the form (A k , ?, ?)), the unifying candidate must have the largest number of points. Thus, there are 2 inequalities d(A k , A i ) > 0, i = k (where d(A k , A i ) denotes the difference in points between the unifying candidate A k and candidate A i prior to the coalition participants' arrangement of all the places except the first). Another 2 inequalities are responsible for the initial results of the election (the first candidate has more points than the second, the second more points than the third). The next step is to understand when the coalition unified by a candidate can successfully manipulate the election. Actually, all the freedom they possess at this point is to give a point from each participant of the coalition (by assigning the second place) to one of the remaining two candidates without violating the condition that their candidate has more points. This can be done if and only if the sum of the differences in points between the unifying candidate and each of the remaining two prior to the coalition members' making a choice of their second most preferrable alternative is greater than the number of people in the coalition. The following theorem summarizes the discussion above.
Theorem 3.5. A profile p = (p 1 , . . . , p 6 ) is manipulable if and only if it satisfies at least one of the two systems of inequalities below.
Example 3.6. The scoring rule with λ = 2 is the Borda count. The system of inequalities (3.1) simplifies to
Now to compute the share of manipulable profiles it remains to compute the volumes of the polytopes P B and P C cutting out the regions of profiles, manipulable by Coal B and Coal C inside the standard simplex ⊂ R 6 . Then the total volume of the region of manipulable profiles is given by Vol(P B ) + Vol(P C ) − Vol(P B ∩ P C ). Afterwards the result needs be multiplied by 6, because in each of the 6 regions and divided by Vol( ) = 1 6! to achieve the final answer.
Case of m ≥ 4 alternatives
When we consider positional voting rules with m = 4 alternatives, the share of manipulable outcomes can be found adhering to the same procedure as before. We recall and slightly rephrase the description. Let
Since the normalized profile vectors are of the form p = (p 1 , . . . , p 24 ) with each p i ≥ 0 and 24 i=1 p i = 1, they are inside the standard simplex ⊂ R 24 (here 24 = 4! is the number of possible preferences of the voters). The inequalities cutting out the region of manipulable outcomes inside the simplex M ⊂ (M is a union of polyhedra) will be presented in Subsection 4.1 following the same principles as in the case of m = 3 candidates. The volume of ⊂ R d is equal to 1 d! , which, since in our case d = 24, becomes 1 24! . However, due to dimension reasons, the precise volume of a polyhedron P ⊂ M and, hence, of the region M itself seems to be impossible to compute using the existing algorithms. In case the precise volume can not be found, it is natural to obtain a sufficiently good approximation of it. One of the most commonly used procedures for this purpose is the Monte Carlo volume estimation. This will be outlined in Subsection 4.2.
Similarly to the case with m = 3 alternatives, one can show that any positional voting rule with m = 4 alternatives and w = (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) is equivalent to one with w = (1, λ , µ , 0) with 1 ≥ λ ≥ µ ≥ 0. However, for the clarity of the exposition we will use the weight vector
instead. The only scoring rules not covered by tuples of weights of the form (4.1) are the rules with α 3 = α 4 = 0. Any such rule is equivalent to either a one with w λ = (λ, 1, 0, 0) with λ ≥ 1 or the plurality rule (w P = (1, 0, 0, 0) ). These two cases will be treated separately.
4.1.
Inequalities for m = 4 alternatives. We proceed with presenting the inequalities. The main difference with the case m = 3 is that no single member of the coalition can give all 1 + µ remaining points to the same candidate, as that would correspond to this alternative being simultaneously ranked second and third in the voter's profile. Let A k ∈ {B, C, D} denote the unifying candidate and M :=max({d(A k , A i =k )}). Prior to the coalition participants' arrangement of all the places except the first, the candidate A k must have the largest number of points. We claim that only two extra inequalities (apart from those responsible to the initial arrangement, the differences d(A k , A i =k ) being positive and distinguishing the max
We start by verifying the necessity of the conditions above. The first condition guarantees that the voaters in Coal A k can assign the second and third ranks in their preferences to the remaining candidates without violating that candidate A k is still ahead of them. No more than µC A k points can be assigned to the candidate Z ∈ {A i =k } with d(A k , Z) = M, hence, at least C A k votes remain to be distributed and the inequality (4.3). The sufficiency of inequalities (4.2) and (4.3) is established via the step by step procedure of filling the preferences of coalition participants presented below.
Step 1. All the members of the coalition start filling their preferences by putting B as the most preferrable alternative. At this point the preferences of all participants of Coal B are identical and equal to (B, ?, ?, ?) , where the question marks stand for the places yet to be assigned;
Step 2. Here we will distinguish between 3 cases:
(a) M ≥ µC A k . In this situation every voter in the coalition updates his preference to (A k , Z, ?, ?) and inequality (4.3) guarantees that the remaining µC A k points can be succesfully distributed between the other candidates.
'people' put candidate Z on the second place (B, Z, ?, ?) and the remaining C A k − k voters rank him third (B, ?, Z, ?). Notice that this way candidate Z gets exactly d(B, Z) = M points and inequality (4.2) assures that the remaining points can be succesfully distributed between the other candidates. 
and inequality (4.2) is violated), case (c) in Step 2 above can occur only if µ < 2. In case of the plurality procedure the question of manipulability by a coaliton with unifying candidate A k reduces to verifying that once all the members of the coalition update their preferences to (A k , * , . . . , * ) all the differences d(A k , A i ) must be positive. Thus we have the following result. (4.5)
To fulfill the promise in the beginning of this section it remains to present the list of inequalities for the class of positional rules with weight vectors of the form w λ = (λ, 1, 0, 0). This list is easily seen to be as follows:
4.2.
Inequalities, general case. Henceforth for convenience of exposition we set λ m−1 := 1 Conjecture 4.5. Let m ≥ 4 and consider a positional voting rule with weight vector w = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m−2 , λ m−1 , 0). A profile p = (p 1 , . . . , p m! ) is manipulable by the coalition with unifying candidate A k if and only if p satisfies the following system of inequalities: 
Proof. We argue by induction on the number of candidates m, the base being m = 4. The last inequality in (4.8) can be rewritten as min 1 +min 2 > C A k , where min 1 = min{d(A k , A i ) | i = k} and min 2 = min 2 {d(A k , A i ) | i = k}. Hence, the last inequality in (4.8) implies that (1) min 1 < C A k < min 1 + min 2 or (2) min 1 > C A k .
In case (2) holds, then each d(A k , A i =k ) > C A k , thus, each 'voter' participating in Coal A k can choose preferences (A k , A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k−1 , A k+1 , . . . , A m ).
If (1) takes place, let Z and X be the candidates with min 1 = d(A k , Z) and min 2 = d(A k , X) respectively. Now min 1 'voters' in Coal A k update their preferences to (A k , Z, ?, . . . , ?) and C A k − min 1 to (A k , X, ?, . . . , ?), after which the question of manipulability reduces to the one for m − 1 alternatives (the initial list without candidate Z) and the claim follows (after we subtract C A k from both sides of the inequalities in (4.8), the system reduces to the one for m − 1 candidates).
The next theorem shows that Conjecture 4.5 holds under certain technical assumptions on the coordinates of the weight vector w. Prior to presenting the precise statement and the proof we would like to illustrate the basic idea of it. Trying to emulate the approach from
Step 2(b) in the beginning of this Section, we find the largest λ i , s.t. λ i C A k is less than the maximal difference in points M 1 between A k and other candidates. The conditions on λ j 's simply assure that such an index i exists. In case i happens to be 2, i.e. M 1 > λ 2 C A k , the whole coalition simply sets their intermediate profiles to be (A k , Z, ?, . . . , ?) for candidate Z with d(A k , Z) = M 1 . Otherwise (i > 2) we split the members of the coalition in two groups, one of which updates the intermediate preferences to (A k , ?, . . . , ?, Z i−1 , ?, . . . , ?) while the other to (A k , ?, . . . , ?, Z i , ?, . . . , ?). It turns out that it is possible to divide the coalition in such proportion (with t people in the first group and C A k − t in the second) that candidate Z gets exactly d(A k , Z) = M 1 points. This is the key step, which allows to proceed by induction.
Theorem 4.8. Conjecture 4.5 holds for positional rules with m ≥ 5 alternatives provided w = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m−2 , λ m−1 , 0) satisfises (4.9)
Proof. We argue by induction on the number of candidates m, the base being m = 4. Consider the set S :
On the other hand i =k d(A k , A i ) ≤ (m − 1)M 1 and the first inequality of (4.8) implies Introduce the weight (4.10) λ σ,σ+1 := (C A k − t)λ σ + tλ σ+1 C A k and set (4.11) w = (λ 1 , . . . , λ σ−1 , λ σ,σ+1 , λ σ+2 , . . . , λ m−1 ).
Notice that the first inequality
which is exactly the one required for the positional rule with m − 1 alternatives and weight vector w . The other inequalities stay unchanged and those for the modified rule with m − 1 alternatives are easily seen to follow from them (the l.h.s. are the same, while the r.h.s. of (4.8) is not less than required). It remains to check that the coordinates of w satisfy conditions (4.9). This is straightforward: λ σ,σ+1 ≥ λ σ+1 ≥ σ+1 σ λ σ+2 , also λ σ−1 ≥ σ−1 σ−2 λ σ ≥ σ σ−1 λ σ,σ+1 and λ j ≥ j j−1 λ j+1 ≥ j+1 j λ j+1 for 3 ≤ j < σ − 1, while for j > σ the conditions (4.9) do not change.
Remark 4.9. Since the weight vectors for Borda count with 5 and 6 alternatives satisfy conditions (4.9) in Theorem 4.8, Conjecture 4.5 holds for these rules.
Monte Carlo volume estimation. Let
⊂ R d be the standard simplex and P ⊂ a polyhedron inside it. Suppose that we randomly choose a point x in our simplex . It follows from the properties of the continuous uniform distribution that the probability for x to reside inside the polytope P is equal to the ratio of the volumes, i.e.
We introduce a Bernoulli random variable ξ by setting
Notice that the expectation of the random variable ξ is θ := E(ξ) = P(x ∈ P) = V(P) V( ) . Thus we have reformulated the problem of finding the ratio of volumes into finding the mean of a Bernoulli random variable. Let Θ n = 1 n n i=1 ξ i and recall that the mean of Θ n is E( Θ n ) = θ, while the variance and standard deviation are given by
Let θ n denote the sample mean. For n sufficiently large the z-test for the hypothesis that the sample mean is equal to the actual mean, i.e. H 0 : θ = θ n is applicable and gives the confidence interval of (4.13) CI n,θ =   θ n − z γ θ n (1 − θ n ) n ; θ n + z γ θ n (1 − θ n ) n   for the value of θ and hence the volume of polyhedron P. The parameter γ is called the confidence level. It means that if we take the n point samples x 1 , . . . , x n ⊂ on numerous occasions and construct interval estimates each time, the resulting intervals would contain the true volume in approximately γ% of the cases. The most common choice for γ is γ = 95%, in which case the constant z γ is equal to 1.96. We invite the interested reader to look at Chapter 4.2.1 in [Rub81] for a more detailed exposition.
Remark 4.10. In case n = 1000000, we have un upper-bound on the length of the confidence interval (CI n,θ ) = 2z γ θn(1− θn) n ≤ 0.001z γ .
The share of manipulable outcomes for plurality, anti-plurality and Borda count in case of m = 4 alternatives are presented in Table 4 .3 below. All computations were carried out in Python (see Appendix A for details). In this section we present the code written in Python used for carrying out the algorithm for finding the share of manipulable outcomes in case of Borda count with m = 4 alternatives. It is not hard to modify the program to perform analogous computations for different rules with different weights (for the cases of plurality and anti-plurality were computed, see Table  4 .3). With a few modifications to the code provided one can find the corresponding results in case of m = 5 or 6 alternatives, when Conjecture 4.5 holds.
Step 1. Create the array of possible preferences with the candidates corresponding to numbers 0 to m − 1 arranged in increasing order. This array has m! elements. Each element of the preferences array is an array of its own with m elements (see lines 14 − 25 in the code After this the point distribution array is created, i.e. the element (i, j) (here 0 ≤ i ≤ m! − 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 3) is the number of points candidate j gets from preference i (lines 27 − 37.) Step 2. Now we are in position to store the inequalities responsible for the initial arrangement of alternatives. As usual we assume that this arrangement is (0, 1, 2, 3) and the 3 inequalities responsible for that are obtained (lines 3 − 8 and 38 − 41) Step 3. Next generate a sample of n ('trials' in the code) random points in the simplex .
For this choose m! random numbers on the closed interval [0; 1], arrange them in a nondecreasing order and take subsequent differences. The points created this way have a uniform distribution in the simplex (see Chapter V.2 in [Dev86] ). The corresponding lines of the code are 43 − 54.
Step 4. The coalition arrays are established. These are m − 1 arrays of m! elements, each element equal to 1 or i, depending on whether preference i belongs to the coalition (lines 55 − 66).
Step 5. The difference arrays are generated (lines 67 − 105).
Step 6. The remaining part of the code stores the inequalities (4.8) responsible for the profile being manipulable by each of the coalitions separately (recall that inequalities (4.8) are written in terms of the elements of difference arrays established on the previous step) and then checks for all sample points to determine how many of them satisfy the initial arrangement conditions and are manipulable by at least one coalition. 
Appendix B: A few results on manipulability with restricted coalitions
Definition 6.1. We call a profile signicantly manipulable (for short, SM) if there exists a candidate Z, who did not emerge as the winner, nevertheless, the subset of voters in Coal Z with preferences of the form (Z, * , . . . , * ) can manipulate the election.
The restriction on coalitions is motivated by the fact that agreement on the most preferable candidate is a solid ground for people to unite in a coalition. Their most desirable result is that this candidate wins the election, which is the reason why the case of signicant manipulability is studied separately. Remark 6.2. For plurality voting rule SM is clearly impossible, as the supporters of each candidate have already put him on the top place, giving one point and no points to the other candidates.
On the contrary, SM for anti-plurality (all candidates except the last in each preference are assigned one point, the last -none; the alternative with the greatest number of points wins) coincides with ordinary manipulability. Thus, we come up with the result of 51.9% (which again agrees with [LM94] ). Before presenting the system of inequalities that the result satisfies if (and only if) it is significantly manipulable, we make the following observation.
Remark 6.3. The group of voters, having the last candidate prior in their preferences can not significantly manipulate an election under anti-plurality or Borda count rule whichever the number of candidates is. Otherwise, as after such a manipulation the last candidate would have the same number of points (his number of points is not influenced by the manipulation) all the other candidates would have to undergo a simultaneous loss of points. That is clearly impossible, because the number of rearranged points equals the number of points initially arranged between the alternatives.
The corresponding system of inequalities for anti-plurality is: determined by the three systems of inequalities (6.2)                        p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 = 1 p 1 − p 2 + p 3 − p 5 > 0, p 1 − p 4 + p 3 − p 6 > 0 p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 4 + p 5 − p 6 > 0 −p 2 + p 3 + p 4 − p 5 + p 6 > 0 −p 1 + p 3 + p 4 + p 6 > 0 p 1 − p 2 + p 3 + p 4 − p 5 − p 6 > 0                        p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 = 1 p 1 − p 2 + p 3 − p 5 > 0, p 1 − p 4 + p 3 − p 6 > 0 p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 4 + p 5 − p 6 > 0 −p 1 − p 3 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 > 0 −p 2 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 > 0 −p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 4 + p 5 + p 6 > 0                        p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 = 1 p 1 − p 2 + p 3 − p 5 > 0, p 1 − p 4 + p 3 − p 6 > 0 p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 4 + p 5 − p 6 > 0 −p 1 + p 2 − p 3 + p 5 + p 6 > 0 p 2 − p 4 + p 5 + p 6 > 0 −p 1 − p 2 − p 3 + p 4 + p 5 + p 6 > 0 . (6.2)
The first two inequalities in all systems are responsible for the elimination of candidate C at the first step, while the third guarantees that alternative A wins afterwards (again w.l.o.g. we assume that the final ranking was A, B, C). We explain the remaining inequalities in the first system (when the coalition of alternative B can manipulate), the corresponding ones for the last two systems are obtained accordingly (these systems determine, whether the supporters of candidate C can manipulate either by eliminating A or B in the first round). As the difference in points between B and A (as well as B and C) evaluated on the second step of Coombs' procedure can not be changed in favor of candidate B, the only chance for the supporters of candidate B to manipulate is to try to eliminate candidate A in the first round. The fourth and fifth inequalities stand for verification of this possibility. The last inequality assures that B wins the election (gets more points than C in round 2).
The volumes of the polytopes cut out by these systems are W 1 = 17 207360 , W 2 = 1 77760 , W 3 = 1 77760 , W 1 ∩ W 2 = 0, W 1 ∩ W 3 = 1 233280 , W 2 ∩ W 3 = 1 155520 , W 1 ∩ W 2 ∩ W 3 = 0. Using the inclusion-exclusion principle, we find that the share of significantly manipulable results is equal to approximately 41.9%.
We summarize the results of this section on significant manipulability in the 
